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Paul E. Griffiths 
 
 
Many philosophers believe that 1) most uses of functional language in biology make 
implicit reference to natural selection and 2) the fundamental way in which biologists 
identify parts and processes in organisms is by their selected function(s). Both these 
claims are mistaken. Much functional language in biology refers to actual causal roles. 
The extensive biological literature on the ‘character concept’ focuses on another 
principle of biological identity, namely homology. This work is outlined and used to 
refute philosophical arguments for the importance and ubiquity of classification by 
adaptive function.  
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1. Introduction 
Over the past quarter of a century a notion of function defined in terms of natural 
selection has become one of the basic tools of analytic philosophy. Philosophers with no 
other interest in the biological sciences reach for the ‘etiological theory of function’ 
(Millikan 1984, 1993; Neander 1991a, 1991b) whenever they feel the need to distinguish 
between what merely happens and what is supposed to happen. The etiological theory 
embodies the standard neo-Darwinian view that biological teleology was rendered 
scientifically respectable by the theory of natural selection2: 
 
"If we ask 'What does a cat have sharp, curved claws for?' and answer simply 'To 
catch mice with', this does not imply a profession of any mythical teleology, but 
the plain statement that catching mice is the function whose survival value, by the 
process of natural selection, has bred cats with this particular form of claw.  
Unless selection is at work, the question 'What for?' cannot receive an answer 
with any real meaning." (Konrad Lorenz 1966, 9) 
 
The English word ‘function’ has many different senses. Two of these seem particularly 
prominent in the biosciences (Godfrey-Smith 1993, Griffiths 1993): 
 
• Selected function - e.g. a sequence of nucleotides GAU has the selected function 
of coding for aspartic acid if one reason that sequence evolved by natural 
                                                 
1
 Paper presented at ‘The concept of function in biology and language’, Universitá di Catania, May 2005. I 
am grateful to that audience for their feedback and to Alan Love, Ingo Brigandt, Rasmus Winther, Marc 
Ereshefsky, Edouard Machery and Brian Hall for extensive comments on an earlier draft. 
2
 The locus classicus is Pittendrigh (1958, 191-3). Important philosophical discussions include (Wimsatt 
1972 see esp. 70; Brandon 1981). 
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selection was because it had the effect of inserting that amino acid into some 
polypeptide in ancestral organisms 
 
• Causal function - e.g. a sequence of nucleotides GAU has the causal function of 
coding for aspartic acid if that sequence has the effect of inserting that amino acid 
into some polypeptide in the organism in which it occurs 
 
The idea of causal function (Cummins 1975) is sometimes presented as a rival to the 
etiological theory (Davies 2001). However, both notions are needed to capture the 
conventional, neo-Darwinian understanding of evolution by natural selection. Neo-
Darwinism distinguishes adaptations, which have evolved by natural selection, from 
adaptive traits, which increase the fitness of organisms that possess them relative to other 
types. By definition, every adaptation was once an adaptive trait, but not all adaptations 
are still adaptive traits and not every adaptive trait is yet an adaptation.  If we use the 
language of functions, a trait is adaptive in virtue of some of its causal functions (those 
that contribute to fitness). A trait is an adaptation for functions which were causal 
functions contributing to fitness in ancestors, and so became selected functions.  
 
In this paper I argue that much functional language in biology refers to causal function. 
Furthermore, enthusiasts for selected function are mistaken when they claim that selected 
function is the primary means by which biologists individuate the parts and processes of 
the organisms they study. Straightforward descriptions of the structure and causal 
function of parts and processes, and classifications of those parts and processes by 
homology, form the basis on which claims about selected function rest. Pacé selected 
function enthusiasts, those straightforward structural and causal functional descriptions 
do not contain implicit references to selected function. 
 
My dispute with selected function enthusiasts thus concerns the nature of ‘biological 
characters’. A ‘character’ is a unit of biological analysis – a part of an organism or a 
process going on in an organism. ‘Character’ simpliciter refers to a determinable property 
(eye colour, a genetic locus) whilst ‘character state’ refers to a determinate value of that 
determinable (blue, AAATCG). Like the word ‘property’ in philosophy, ‘character’ is 
used both loosely, to refer to any measurable feature of an organism, and strictly, to refer 
only to the features recognised by some theory of biological characters: “Although a 
character is any trait or feature of the phenotype, there are many definitions of 
‘character’, and there has been even more discussion of characters and the character 
concept” (Hall 2003, 415). This discussion of the character concept proceeds against a 
general background assumption that characters are ‘homologies’ in one of the senses 
defined below: they are individuated by common ancestry or common developmental 
mechanisms3. In contrast, it has become widely accepted in philosophy that biological 
categories of part and process are defined by their selected function. The claim that hearts 
are organs whose selected function is to pump blood is commonly taken as an epitome of 
anatomical classification. Karen Neander is perhaps the leading advocate of this view. 
Neadner’s (2002) defends her view against what she terms ‘functional minimalism’. 
                                                 
3
 Important recent collections on the character concept include (Hall 1994, 1999; Schlosser and Wagner 
2004; Wagner 2001; Müller and Newman 2003) 
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Functional minimalism is the view defended by Ronald Amundson and George Lauder 
and myself that disciplines like anatomy, physiology, molecular biology and 
developmental biology are primarily concerned with characters individuated by 
homology (Amundson and Lauder 1994; Griffiths 1994). Neander thinks that 
classification by selected function is more common in these sciences than either 
Amundson and Lauder or I allow. Neander is particularly critical of my (1994) account of 
homology. This account was certainly not adequate. The 1990s saw an explosion of new 
work as a result of the discovery of ‘deep homology’ in molecular developmental biology 
and the meteoric rise of the new discipline of evolutionary developmental biology (Hall 
1992; Arthur 1997; Raff 1996) and I did not address these new developments until some 
years after the account Neander criticizes (Griffiths 1999). However, neither Neander’s 
criticisms of my (1994) account nor her own positive proposals are grounded in this 
recent literature on homology. Instead, her case for what we might call ‘functional 
revanchism’ (by analogy with the ‘revanchist’ desire of a nation to regain lost territory) is 
driven by the fundamental idea that has driven her work on biological categories for the 
last two decades (Neander 1983). Any classification of organisms into parts must allow 
there to be abnormal instances of each part. Neadner argues that only a classification in 
terms of adaptive function will create categories that are ‘abnormality inclusive’. A 
similar theme has been important in Ruth Millikan’s work. Millikan (2002) argues that a 
biologically meaningful causal analysis of a system’s functioning (causal function) can 
only be conducted in the light of an understanding of the ‘proper functioning’ of the 
system (selected function). 
 
What is ‘functional minimalism’? My view has always been that there are two 
fundamental aspects to the evolutionary process, common descent and adaptation. These 
give rise to two overlaid patterns in the distribution of biological characters, one captured 
by phylogeny and homology, the other by functional classifications. Evolution is a matter 
of ‘genealogical actors playing ecological roles’ (Hull 1987). Classification by genealogy 
is seen in modern, phylogenetic systematics, and in the use of homology in sciences such 
as anatomy, physiology, and comparative morphology. But the same organisms and parts 
of organisms are classified in terms of their ecological role: organisms are classified into 
ecological categories like predator and prey and parts are classified by their adaptive 
function (Griffiths 1994, 1996a, 1996b). Categories defined by selected function are thus 
important and ubiquitous. Neander, however, thinks that categories defined by selected 
function are still more ubiquitous: the characters which are grouped together by analogy 
are not, as I have argued, classified by homology, but are themselves classified by 
selective function. The main difference between functional minimalists and functional 
revanchists thus concerns function-talk in ‘experimental biology’ (Weber 2004) -  
disciplines such as anatomy, physiology, developmental biology and molecular biology 
which experimentally investigate the structure and function of biological systems. 
Functional minimalists maintain that unless these fields turn their attention to specifically 
evolutionary questions, they investigate function in the causal sense. Revanchists reply 
that they are always, at least implicitly, investigating function in the selected sense 4. 
 
                                                 
4
 This claim has also been ably criticized by Arno Wouters (2005a; 2005). 
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In contrast to the mass of philosophical work on selected function (Allen, Bekoff, and 
Lauder 1997; Buller 1999; Ariew, Cummins, and Perlman 2002), there has until recently 
been little philosophical work on homology  (but see Matthen 1998, 2000). In my own 
earlier work homology is treated as a concept rooted in phylogenetic systematics. 
Recently, however, philosophers of biology have turned their attention to evolutionary 
developmental biology, a field that has generated an extremely sophisticated theoretical 
discourse around the concepts of homology, modularity and character. Philosophers have 
responded to, and indeed taken part in, this discussion (Love 2001, 2004; Love and Raff 
2003; Raff and Love 2004; Brigandt 2002, 2003a; Winther 2001, In Press). Before 
responding to functional revanchism in more detail I need to lay out the basic 
considerations about homology derived from this literature which will underpin my 
discussion. These considerations apply equally to homologies of structure and to 
homologies of function, the importance of which has been evident at least since the rise 
of modern Darwinian approaches to behavior (Tinbergen 1951; Lorenz 1950). 
 
2. Homology 
 
‘Homologue… The same organ in different animals under every variety of form and 
function’ (Owen 1843, 374).  
 
Homology is a relation of biological ‘sameness’ (Camardi 2001; Brigandt 2002). Here I 
lay out three fundamentals about homology in contemporary biology: homology is an 
equivalence relation that groups characters into a hierarchy of equivalence classes; 
homologies can be identified at different levels of biological organisation; and there are 
numerous theoretical elucidations of homology, whose relation to the phenomenon of 
homology is analogous to the relation of the many so-called ‘species concepts’ to the 
phenomenon of biodiversity. 
 
2.1 Homology forms a hierarchy of equivalence classes 
Like biological taxa, the homologous parts of organisms form groups within groups. The 
wing of a European house sparrow is homologous to the wing of a flamingo – both are 
avian wings. The avian wing is homologous to the forelimb of a lizard – both are tetrapod 
forelimbs. The tetrapod forelimb is homologous to the pectoral fin of a sarcopterygian 
fish – both are instances of the anterior paired appendages of Sarcopterygii.  None of 
these relationships is a matter of degree – the avian wing is not more or less a homologue 
of the pectoral fin any more than the class Aves is more or less part of the Sarcopterygii 
or a sparrow more or less a bird. When Neander writes that ‘Homology is a relation of 
degree, somewhat akin to the relation of resemblance or genetic relatedness’ (Neander 
2002, 402) she must have been misled by an unusual usage of the word ‘homology’ in 
molecular biology (see below, 2.4) or by phrases like ‘closely homologous’. The latter 
refers to ‘taxonomic distance', which is a measure on the topology of a cladogram or a 
phylogenetic tree, and no more implies that homology is a degree property than the claim 
that two species of birds are ‘closely related’ implies that membership of a taxon is a 
degree property. There are also cases have led biologists to talk of ‘partial homology’, 
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such as when the embryonic primordia that typically give rise to two different parts of a 
plant fuse to form a single part during the ontogeny of an atypical species (e.g. Sattler 
1990). Some authors have also written of ‘partial homology’ when large characters in 
different species can be analysed into smaller characters only some of which are 
homologous. For example, some but not all regions of chromosome 2 in the D genome of 
hexaploid wheat are homologous to rice chromosome 4. Finally, some authors have 
spoken of ‘partial homology’ when two parts in different species share developmental 
mechanisms that are homologous (see next section). Neander does not mention these 
phenomena, but in any case they do not show that homology is a similarity relation, any 
more than the existence of hybrid taxa shows that taxon membership is a similarity 
relation. 
 
2.2. Levels of homology 
One of the most exciting developments of the last decade has been the realization that the 
identity of parts at one level of biological organization may be independent of the identity 
of their constituent parts at a lower level of organization: 
 
“Both homology and homoplasy can be defined at different levels without making 
judgments about homology or homoplasy, or lack of homology/homoplasy at 
other levels. Indeed, to identify the hierarchical level of homology or homoplasy 
being specified, we should always speak of ‘homologous as limbs, homologous as 
digits, homologous as a developmental process, homologous as a gene network, 
etc., ’ and ditto for ‘homoplastic as…’ (Hall 2003, 425; see also Wagner 2001; 
Müller and Wagner 1996; Abouheif et al. 1997). 
 
This realization came about primarily as a result of the discovery of highly conserved 
gene control circuits underlying traits that are not considered to be homologous in 
themselves. Thus, for example, the paired appendages of vertebrates and arthropods share 
ancient genetic mechanisms that are hypothesized to have been in place controlling 
outgrowths of some sort from the bodies of the most ancient animals (Capdevila and 
Belmonte 2001). More famously, the vertebrate ‘camera’ eye and the insect compound 
eye share genetic mechanisms that may have been involved in the induction of a light-
sensitive epithelium prior to the evolution of either eye (Wagner 2001, 5). Nevertheless, 
neither arthropod and vertebrate paired appendages nor camera and compound eyes are 
homologous as morphological structures. Conversely, the fact that the gene bicoid 
controls the formation of the anterior-posterior axis in Drosophila but not in other 
dipteran species does not undermine the claim that the elements that form along that axis 
in Drosophila (and indeed the axis itself) are homologous to those in other insects 
(Laublicher and Wagner 2001, 65-66). Closer to home, the cascade of gene expression 
that induces masculinisation of the fetus in Ellobius rodents and the male sexual 
characteristics that result from that process are homologous to those seen in other 
mammalian species, despite the fact that some Ellobius species have lost the Y 
chromosome and SRY, the ‘sex determining’ gene (Just et al. 1995). The lesson of these 
examples is that evolution can preserve a morphological structure whilst transforming the 
molecular mechanism that produces it and, conversely, evolution can redeploy an 
existing mechanism to underpin the development of an evolutionary novelty. Arguably, 
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behavioral homologies and homologies of function in anatomy can form another 
independent level of homology, with the anatomical structures that support function 
being transformed over time whilst the behavioral character or the functional character 
(e.g. the biomechanical profile of a movement) remains the same (Lauder 1990). Levels 
of biological organization are not completely independent, of course. Homology of 
underlying mechanisms is important, but not indefeasible, evidence for homology at a 
higher level. 
 
2.3. ‘Homology concepts’ 
As with the species concept, there are alternative theoretical elucidations of homology, 
which biologists refer to as different ‘homology concepts’ and often think of as 
competitors. Here I can only sketch the two main approaches (for more detail see 
Brigandt 2002, 2003a; Hall 1994, 1999, 2003; Wagner 2001). ‘Taxic’ or ‘Darwinian’ 
approaches to homology treat characters in two or more organisms as homologous if they 
are descended from a single character in an ancestral organism. ‘Developmental’ or  
‘biological’ (Wagner 1989) approaches, however, treat characters as homologous if the 
preferred theory of how organisms develop identifies them as instances of the same 
developmental phenomenon at some level of analysis (see above). Günther Wagner has 
argued that the taxic approach is essentially parasitic on a developmental understanding 
of homology, because it defines character identity horizontally - between taxa - but not 
vertically - between parent and offspring. Unlike whole organisms, parts of organisms do 
not give birth to little parts and so two parts in one organism cannot be literally 
‘descended from a common ancestral part’(except in the case of parts actually present in 
the gametes, such as genomes, see 4.2 below). The taxic approach thus presupposes and 
leaves unanalyzed the claim that certain characters in offspring are the same as 
(homologous to) certain characters in their parents. At the level of biological practice, 
this need not be a serious problem. Different homology concepts find their homes in 
different biological disciplines and reflect the particular needs of those disciplines 
(Brigandt 2002, 2003a). The taxic homology concept finds its home in disciplines 
concerned with reconstructing evolutionary change, disciplines that are only concerned 
with homologies between different taxa (‘taxic homologies’). These disciplines can begin 
with a character set consisting of more or less arbitrary, operational characters and 
bootstrap their way into a set of characters whose stability and congruence with one 
another are reason to believe that they represent real morphological units (Griffiths 
1999). But at a theoretical level, this procedure only works because there are real units of 
evolutionary change, and the taxic homology concept does nothing to explain this: “…the 
main goal of a biological [= developmental] homology concept is to explain why certain 
parts of the body are passed on from generation to generation for millions of years as 
coherent units of evolutionary change…” (Wagner 1994, 279). 
 
The most striking difference between the taxic and developmental approaches is that the 
former is simply inapplicable to ‘serial homology’ – the homology relationship that holds 
between different vertebrae in the spine or different segments in an arthropod. Serial 
homologues are repeated parts of a single organism, rather than corresponding parts on 
different organisms as the taxic approach requires. One appealing but ultimately 
uninformative way to deal with serial homology is to say that both taxic and serial 
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homology occur when two characters ‘share genetic information’. This proposed solution 
can also be extended to answer Wagner’s criticism of the taxic homology concept – the 
homologous characters of offspring and parent occurs are those which ‘share genetic 
information’. But ‘shared genetic information’ here has two possible interpretations. On 
one interpretation the proposed definition does not work and on the other it collapses into 
the developmental homology concept. The first interpretation takes ‘genetic information’ 
to be the sequence information (sensu Crick) located in DNA elements. The discussion of 
levels of homology above shows that homology defined as shared genetic information in 
this sense will yield the wrong answer in many cases (Roth 1999, 321-4; Abouheif et al. 
1997). Shared genetic information in this sense is, like shared embryonic origin, good but 
defeasible evidence for homology. The second interpretation takes ‘genetic information’ 
to be developmental information in some more general sense – whatever it is in the 
developmental matrix that allows organisms to reliably reconstruct form across the 
generations. For example, ‘genetic information’ in this sense may turn out to be an 
emergent and multiply realisable property of genomic regulatory networks. But rather 
than clarifying the homology concept, the appeal to genetic information in this sense is 
no more than a promissory note for a developmental homology concept. The idea that 
homologues reflect shared ‘genetic information’ becomes another way to state that 
characters are homologous if they are instances of the same phenomenon at some level of 
analysis in a theory of how organisms develop  
 
What then is homology? It is a manifest fact that the same parts and processes can be 
found in different organisms and in different places in one organism, just as it is a 
manifest fact that organisms form species. Both ideas could be wrong, but the burden of 
proof is massively on the side of the sceptic. About two hundred years ago biologists 
started to develop powerful operational methods for identifying these parts and processes 
and that research tradition has ever since provided the basis for the investigation of 
structure and (causal) function - ‘the hierarchical basis of comparative biology’ (Hall 
1994). So homology, like the existence of species, is a phenomenon that stands in need of 
explanation (Brigandt 2003b). It has been clear since Darwin that a critical part of that 
explanation is provided by common descent. However, the criteria of homology have in 
each period reflected the contemporary understanding of how organisms grow, and it is 
clear that developmental biology is another critical component of the explanation. As 
everywhere in science, our understanding of the phenomenon of homology gets refined 
by our attempts to explain it. The few sketches of scientific practice scattered through this 
paper give some idea of our current understanding. 
 
2.4. Homology in molecular biology 
Some molecular biologists use the term ‘homology’ to refer to the degree of 
correspondence between aligned sequences of nucleic acid or protein. Thus, they might 
describe two genes as 50% homologous or as having 50% ‘sequence homology’ (Hillis 
1999). ‘Homology’ in this usage is best regarded, not as an alternative theoretical 
interpretation of homology, but merely as a homonym (Brigandt 2003a). In support of 
this interpretation, note that molecular biologists have invented a new term for homology 
in the traditional sense, or, in fact, two new terms. Nucleic acid sequences, proteins, etc 
which are shared by different species as a result of descent from a single ancestral species 
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are called ‘orthologues’ (= taxic homology). Genes in the same genome originating from 
gene duplication events are called ‘paralogues’ (= serial homology). In addition, 
sequences which enter one genome from another genome by lateral transfer are known as 
‘xenologues’. The use of ‘homology’ to refer to mere sequence similarity of molecules 
still raises the hackles of many biologists, including many molecular biologists, so in the 
rest of this paper I will stick to the traditional usage. 
 
3. Neander on Taxic Homology 
Neander (2002) is highly critical of my claim that “A homologous trait is a character that 
unites a clade. Every species in the clade either has the trait or is descended from a 
species that has it” (Griffiths 1994, 212). A clade is a group of species which contains all 
and only the descendants of some ancestral species and this was an attempt to capture the 
notion of taxic homology, which I then referred to as ‘cladistic homology’. My definition 
is inadequate because it takes no account of the alternative approaches to homology 
described above, and because it does not mark the distinction between primitive and 
derived characters, both of which may ‘unite’ a clade in the sense specified. But these are 
not Neander’s criticisms. 
 
Neander derives numerous absurdities from my definition. She interprets that definition 
to mean not just that some biological characters unite certain clades, but also that those 
characters have no other properties of any kind. This allows her to argue that on my 
definition we cannot distinguish a species that actually has a homologous trait from a 
species which has lost the homologous character through evolution. Furthermore, we 
cannot distinguish two characters shared by the same clade, and we cannot identify the 
point in an evolutionary tree at which the character first occurs, because we can say 
nothing about it except that it first occurs at that point. Neander also suggests that 
because all organisms are descended from a single common ancestor, my definition 
collapses all traits to ‘The Trait’, but this criticism seems to rest on her mistaken view 
that homology is a degree property. The rest of Neander’s criticisms come to this: 
“…before two traits can be identified as homologous with respect to each other, we need 
some specification of the traits in question.” (Neander 2002, 402. Her emphasis).  But the 
‘character’ referred to in my definition is just this ‘specification of the traits in question’. 
The definition was intended to characterise homology as understood in cladistic 
systematics, and it should be read in line with the basic cladistic procedures described in 
my paper. In cladistic systematics homologies are inferred from a set of measured 
similarities between organisms, known as ‘shared characters’. Suppose we want to 
construct a cladogram using data concerning the DNA sequence coding for a suitable 
molecule in each species. Any pair of the aligned sequences will be identical at some 
positions and different at others. Where they are identical, this shared character may be a 
homology or it may be a homoplasy, depending on whether the nearest common ancestor 
of the pair had this character state and whether there have been any intervening character 
state changes in either lineage. Hence when we say that the character state of the first 
nucleotide in each sequence is C we are giving a physical specification – that nucleotide 
is cytosine. After constructing the cladogram which our preferred algorithm identifies as 
the best explanation of the whole pattern of similarity and difference amongst the 
sequences, we may conclude that having C at that position is a homologue uniting some 
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clade of the organisms we are classifying. But some species in the clade may not have C 
at that position if the simplest explanation of the whole pattern of data is that this 
particular species has lost C. Conversely, some species outside the clade may have 
acquired C by convergent evolution. Those species have the same character state, but in 
their case it is not an example of the homologue we have identified.  
 
It is genuinely confusing that  ‘character’ can mean either any measurable property of an 
organism or only a property recognised as biologically meaningful in some theory of the 
organism. However, philosophers are familiar just the same ambiguity in the term 
‘property’ itself, which can be used loosely to refer to any definable characteristic or 
more strictly to refer only to those ‘properties’ recognised in some philosopher’s 
ontology.  My paper is a discussion of cladistic approaches to homology, so a charitable 
reading would take ‘character’ in my definition to have the sense it has at the 
corresponding point in the cladistic procedure for inferring homology -  a measurable 
point of resemblance between taxa that may or may not be ‘real’ resemblance (a 
homology). Characters like flight and the ‘camera’ eye, which I discussed, make it clear 
how cladistic systematists avoid the absurdities that Neander identifies. The ‘camera’ eye 
is shared by vertebrates and cephalopods but is not homologous in these two taxa. It is 
perfectly consistent to define the vertebrate eye as a certain kind of structure (the camera 
eye) when and only when that structure appears in a particular clade of organisms (the 
vertebrates). Some subterranean vertebrates have lost their eyes and the camera eye 
character evolved independently in some ancestral cephalopod.  
 
I suspect that Neander’s failure to recognise the possibility of using simple, operational 
characters as data to support a more theoretical claim about what the ‘real’ characters are 
reflects her view that no straightforward descriptions of structure or causal function in 
biology are possible without knowledge of the selected functions of the relevant 
characters. I discuss this view in Section 6. 
 
 
4. Revanchism I: ‘Functional homologues’ 
Neander offers three arguments for functional revanchism. The third of these is her 
‘master argument’, designed to show that all descriptions of structure or causal function 
in biology depend on prior knowledge of the selected function of the relevant characters. 
It is clear from her presentation, however, that the other two arguments are supposed to 
have some independent force, so I will consider them before proceeding to the ‘master 
argument’. 
 
Neander’s first argument is that if biologists are to establish any clear distinction between 
one part and another, they must of necessity supplement considerations of homology with 
considerations of selected function. Consequently, the parts of organisms are what she 
calls ‘functional homologues’. Now, ‘functional homologues’ in molecular biology are 
sequences that play the same causal role (Abouheif et al. 1997), and ‘homologies of 
function’ in morphology are causal functions which two species can perform because a 
common ancestor performed them, but Neander does not use ‘functional homologue’ in 
either of these existing senses. Instead, she uses the phrase to refer to taxic homologues 
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which stand out in a transformation sequence because they introduce a novel functional 
role – something closer to what biologists mean by a ‘key innovation’. She writes: 
 
“If we conceive of the phylogenetic tree as a branching flow of (genetic and 
other) information, the issue is how to draw a conceptual line in this flow. Clearly 
there will be few if any sharp boundaries. Nonetheless, we must distinguish one 
trait from another, for physiology requires such distinctions. My suggestion, the 
central suggestion of this chapter, is this: One main way in which this is done is 
by drawing conceptual lines at those places where there is a significant change in 
what there was selection for. (Neander 2002, 403)  
 
The picture Neander seems to have in mind is that of a paleontologist following the 
transformation of, say, a lobe-fin into a tetrapod limb  and being unable to say in exactly 
which ancestor the transition from fin to limb occurred. This picture is consistent with her 
belief that homology is a degree property which does not allow any sharp boundaries to 
be drawn. Now, of course, homology is not a degree property, and even if it were, 
changes in selection pressure would not be a good place to look for sharp boundaries. But 
it may be a mistake to take Neander at her word when she says that homologues grade 
indistinguishably into one another. We can read her as a traditional Darwinian gradualist 
who believes that there is a vast hierarchy of homologies within homologies, each 
representing a tiny character state change, and that the problem is to single out some of 
these changes as significant. On this reading she is discussing the problem of 
‘evolutionary novelty’ (Mayr 1960).  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
 
The most detailed example Neander gives of how adaptive function can supplement a 
classification by homology concerns “the mammalian inner ear bones and the reptilian 
jaw bones  and the portions of the gill arches of fishes that are their homologues” 
(Neander 2002, 402). What she has in mind is that one of the mammalian ear ossicles, the 
incus, is homologous with the quadrate bone (fused to the skull) in reptiles and other 
tetrapods. This in turn is homologous to a region of the palatoquadrate bone in other 
teleosts, the clade that unites bony fishes and all terrestrial vertebrates. This character in 
teleosts is homologous with the dorsal portion of the mandibular arch (jaw) in sharks and 
rays, and this character in gnathostomes, the clade of jawed vertebrates, is homologous 
with the first gill-arch in jawless fish, such as the lamprey (Fig. 1.). It is plausible that 
these distinct characters were linked by many intermediates and Neander claims that 
biologists divide the series into a small number of named characters because they “[draw] 
conceptual lines at those places where there is a significant change in what there was 
selection for (For example, from selection for jaw support to selection for audition)” 
(Neander 2002, 403). Her suggestion is that the transformation series from gill arch to 
incus should be divided into three segments rather than two or four because there are two 
distinct changes of selected function, from breathing to ‘jaw support’ and later to 
‘audition’. But, first, this is certainly not the only way in which biologists single out some 
character state changes as particularly significant, and, second, when biologists do treat a 
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character state change as a ‘key innovation’ this is not because they need to draw a line in 
a bafflingly complex transformation series.  
 
These points are evident in Neander’s own example. In standard presentations, the series 
is divided into five characters, not three, two of which, the palatoquadrate bone and the 
quadrate bone, function to support the jaw (the palatoquadrate cartilage is part of the 
jaw). The prominence of these five stages stems from the fact that they are the actual 
character states seen in major taxa – mammals, reptiles, bony fishes, cartilaginous fishes 
and jawless fishes. The fact that these five characters are not defined by their selected 
function in the way Neander suggests is evident from prominent theories about their 
evolution. The quadrate bone in reptiles, where it is fused to the skull, does play a role in 
hearing. It transmits vibration from the ground – something with obvious adaptive 
significance for both predator and prey. The transformation of the quadrate into the incus 
may have been driven by increased selection for hearing in early, nocturnal mammals. 
What creates an obvious break at this point in the series is not change of function, but the 
traditional morphological criteria – whether the bone is fused to the skull. Turning to the 
other character that Neander claims is defined by a selected function, an important recent 
study suggests that the initial evolution of the vertebrate jaw – the enlargement and more 
powerful articulation of the first gill arch to allow it to close the mouth cavity – was an 
adaptation to move water through the gills and was only later co-opted for feeding 
(Mallatt 1996). Thus, while ‘jaw’ is plausibly a functional term, like ‘wing’, the 
vertebrate jaw itself is not defined by its function, but is a homologue identified using 
traditional morphological characters, both structural and (causal) functional (e.g. 
enlargement and more powerful articulation). 
 
Neander’s ‘functional homologues’ resemble biologists’ ‘key innovations’ – features like 
the vertebrate jaw which allow an organism to perform a new adaptive function and may 
underpin an adaptive radiation by its descendants (Mayr 1960). In modern synthesis 
biology, with its strong emphasis on gradual change, this idea was used to make sense of 
the idea of evolutionary novelty: novelties are character state changes which enable new 
functions. However, this notion was not introduced to draw distinctions in bafflingly 
continuous transformation series, but to elucidate the idea that some new characters are 
genuinely novel, whilst other are merely variations on a theme. Moreover, recent work on 
evolutionary novelty has focused on a different elucidation of this idea: a novelty is a 
character that cannot be homologised to any preexisting character, such as the Chelonian 
(turtle) shell (Müller and Wagner 1991; for philosophical discussion, see Love 2001; 
Love 2004). So while some homologues may be prominent because their appearance 
marks the ability to perform a new function (first as causal, then as selected), others are 
prominent because their appearance marks the beginning of a new structure. 
 
 
5. Revanchism II: The appeal to practice 
Before offering her ‘master argument’, Neander makes a straightforward appeal to 
biological practice. She points out that biologists study the function, as well as the 
structure, of the parts of organisms and offers an example in which physiologists have 
classified muscle fibres using a functional property, namely the manner in which they 
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contract (2002, 408). She says that systematists sometimes look at these functional 
properties when making homology judgments (409). The problem with this appeal to 
practice is that it equivocates on two sense of the word ‘function’. Descriptive functional 
properties (e.g. actual causal roles) play a critical role in anatomical and physiological 
reasoning. But descriptive functional properties, such as the biomechanical properties of 
the jaw or units of animal behavior, such as the ‘ghost dive’ and the ‘weed trick’ in the 
famous courtship display of the Great Crested Grebe (Huxley 1914), are on a par with 
descriptive structural properties like bone density or feather morphology. These 
descriptive properties, whether functional or structural, are the things that are judged 
homologous or analogous between species. The relative importance of descriptions of 
causal function and descriptions of structure in anatomy and physiology is a completely 
separate issue from the relative importance of selected function and homology.  
 
There is a sense in which this reply is unfair to Neander, since she believes that all 
references to function (and indeed structure) are implicitly references to adaptive 
function. But unless that ‘master argument’ succeeds, her appeal to biological practice 
simply fails to mark the distinction between what something actually does and what 
natural selection has designed it to do. Moreover, not marking this distinction causes her 
to seriously misunderstand Amundson and Lauder (1994). Neander argues that their 
account reduces to the view that biological classification is classification by structure 
alone (2002, 409-10). Even the title of their paper is misleading, she says, because it 
promises a defense of ‘the use of causal role functions in biology’ whilst the paper only 
defends the use of structural descriptions in biology (Neander 2002, 393). But Lauder is a 
functional morphologist, and well-known for his advocacy of the importance of 
functional characters in diagnosing homology! If we consider Neander’s own example, 
muscle contractions, Lauder has written, “I would argue that any definable pattern of 
muscle movement is an organismal character just like any structural feature. Just like a 
structural character, functions may be considered homologous if they characterize a 
natural, monophyletic clade of taxa.” (Lauder 1999, 186) The idea that Amundson and 
Lauder advocate classification by structure alone is quite mistaken. They think 
anatomical characters are classified by homology in the sense usual in the science of 
which Lauder is a practitioner and Amundson a historian – a historical relationship 
diagnosed using evidence from both structural and (causal) functional characters. 
Neander accuses them of mistaking the structural criteria used to recognize characters for 
what actually defines those characters (2002, 410). In fact, they use descriptive criteria in 
just the way she recommends, but to infer homology, not selected function. They make a 
powerful case that ‘functional’ anatomy and morphology study causal functions and 
Neander’s appeal to practice does nothing to blunt the force of their argument. It is left to 
her deeper, philosophical argument to convince us that when scientists report the results 
of their experimental analyses of anatomical structures they are, implicitly, inferring the 
selection history of those structures. 
 
6. Revanchism III: Abnormality inclusive categories 
Neander’s argument that all references to function (and indeed structure) in anatomy, 
physiology, morphology and similar sciences are implicit references to selection history 
is simple. She notes that the categories used in these sciences include abnormal instances. 
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A diseased heart is still a heart, and, to get away from that hackneyed example, an 
abnormal ‘weed trick’ produced by a neurologically impaired Grebe is still a ‘weed 
trick’. She argues that ‘abnormality inclusive categories’ must be ‘essentially historical 
categories’(2002, 413), from which she infers that they must be defined by selected 
function: 
 
“The relevant notions [of function and structure] are both ‘normative’ in the sense 
that they are both notions of the normal, in the teleological as opposed to the 
statistical sense of the term, if we assume an etiological account of each of them, 
Abnormality inclusive categories involve a notion of structure and function that is, to 
recall the title of Amundson and Lauder’s paper, with, not without, a purpose.” 
(Neander 2002, 414) 
 
But categories of taxic homology are equally ‘essentially historical’. Abnormal and 
diseased instances of a character are homologous to normal instances because abnormal 
and diseased instances are descended from the same common ancestor as normal 
instances. Although it is not essentially historical, the developmental approach to 
homology also yields abnormality inclusive categories: it would be puzzling if an 
approach designed to identify characters across evolutionary transformations could not 
identify them across perturbing causes such as disease processes! Thus, for example, my 
first cervical vertebrae is serially homologous to my damaged third lumbar vertebrae for 
the same reason that it is serially homologous to my undamaged fourth lumbar vertebrae. 
All three vertebrae differ in form, but all are instances of a repeated unit of development 
identified by a theory of the vertebrate skeleton. The development of L3 was a 
perturbation of that particular developmental pattern.  
 
Neander’s ‘master argument’ fails, and the need for abnormality inclusive categories can 
be met using homology. But this is not to say that biology does not use selected function 
categories! Biological ‘analogies’ are classifications by shared evolutionary purpose 
(selected function). They group together homologues in virtue of shared features of their 
(separate) selection histories. Birds and bats have wings for flying, so ‘wing’ is an 
analogy, but the avian wing and the chiropteran wing are homologies. Categories of 
analogy are essential when studying adaptation. To test a model of optimal wing design 
for maneuvering flight in a forest canopy, we need a representative sample of wings 
whose selected function is to enable their bearers to fly through dense forest. Part of 
being a ‘representative sample’ is taking into account phylogeny, as characters that are 
homologous to one another are not genuinely independent data points for this test. The 
use of these two classification schemes to illuminate one another is the ‘comparative 
method’ in biology (Griffiths 1996a) – we need both the ‘unity of type’ and the ‘effect of 
the conditions of existence’ to understand biological form (Darwin 1964, 206). 
 
There is, however, a fundamental asymmetry between analogies and homologies. 
Classifications by selected function (analogies) are logically dependent on classifications 
by homology (Griffiths 1994, 213-214; see also Neander 2002, 405 fn.12): 
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1. A character has a selected effect function only if it is a member of a lineage of 
characters that has a history of selection for that function  
2. Organisms give birth to organisms, but characters do not give birth to little 
characters and so they do not form lineages except as corresponding parts of 
ancestor and descendant, that is, as homologues 
3. To say that a character token t has some selected function is, by definition, to say 
that t is a token of a type T defined by homology and there is a lineage of tokens 
of T with a history of selection for that function 
 
Even a hypothetical assignment of selected function to a character is, by definition, a 
hypothetical postulation of a series of ancestral characters to which that character is 
homologous. In contrast, classifications by homology are logically independent of 
classifications by selected function. The claim that two characters are homologous is 
quite consistent with neither of the characters having any selected function: deleterious 
mutations found in two different species, for example, can be homologous.  
 
 
7. Selection and Biological Idealisation 
I have shown that classifications by homology can be ‘abnormality inclusive’, but I 
suspect that many readers will be left wondering whether this is merely one aspect of a 
larger problem that only an appeal to selected function can solve. Biological systems are 
highly variable, so how can biologists construct a canonical description of a certain type 
of system without relying on a distinction between what is evolutionarily Normal and 
evolutionarily abNormal – between those features designed by natural selection and those 
not so designed? In a recent paper Ruth Millikan has suggested that this distinction is 
needed not just to distinguish normal from pathological variation, but also to identify 
what is inside and outside a single biological system, and to define the conditions under 
which that system is operating as opposed to participating in biologically irrelevant 
causal processes such as being dissolved in acid (Millikan 2002). Millikan’s concerns, 
and similar concerns voiced by Neander, point to an important issue, namely, the nature 
of scientific idealisation in the biological sciences. Darwinian populations are clusters of 
variation not constrained by any ideal type, but experimental biologists need to construct 
idealised models of the individuals that make up those populations. The study of how this 
is accomplished is made more urgent by the emerging consensus that scientific 
explanation in biology consists to a very considerable extent of the discovery of 
mechanisms – highly idealised descriptions of the operation of chosen causal pathways 
through complex biological systems (Craver and Darden 2005). While there is no space 
here to give a full account of biological idealisation (see Griffiths In Preparation), I will 
briefly indicate some of the other resources that are available to experimental biologists 
in the construction of ideal systems for causal analysis. 
 
First, like scientists in most other fields, biologists construct mathematical models of 
complex systems, abstracting away from those aspects of the biology that cannot be 
tractably modelled with the chosen formalism. In this respect an idealised cell is no 
different from an idealised model of a subduction zone in geology. The cell is not 
simplified in the biological model because evolution designed the cell to be a perfect 
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rectangle and all departures from this form are abNormal. It is simplified for the same 
reason that the shape of the two plates is simplified in the model of subduction – to 
reduce the computational complexity of the model.  
 
Second, the purpose of many ‘model systems’ is to facilitate discovering basic 
mechanisms. A first step in a discovery process of this kind is the choice – or more likely 
the construction – of one or more model systems. A model system is a practical 
idealisation – an actual physical system competent to produce the effect to be explained 
and tractable to experiment using the techniques to hand. The final explanation – the 
mechanism - consists of a description of the actual operation of one or more model 
systems. When biological idealisation takes the form of the construction of a model 
system for the elucidation of a basic mechanism the experimenter need not be concerned 
whether the experimental system is Normal. Because the questions being investigated 
concern the basis mechanisms that allow certain life processes to occur it can be assumed 
that any model system derived from the original in which the effect can be produced will 
retain these mechanisms.5  The most important feature of the model system is tractability 
in the laboratory. Laboratory strains of the nematode worm C. elegans, for example, were 
not bred to be Normal but to be identical and easy to maintain.  
 
Third, in many cases the function of a standardised description of a biological system is 
simply to provide a reference standard, so that many researchers can work on identical 
material, and so that the variation they uncover in natural examples of the system can be 
characterised against that common standard. ‘The human genome’ is a good example. 
Little effort was made to ensure that the material sequenced by either the public or the 
private project was Normal. The most important feature of the data stored in the human 
genome reference sequence is that it is readily available to all researchers.  
 
Thus, while there are clearly some contexts in which biologists need to appeal to 
something like evolutionary Normality in order to characterise an appropriate ideal 
system for analysis, there are many other contexts in which biologists use other forms of 
idealisation. This should not be surprising, since idealisation is a ubiquitous part of 
scientific discovery and explanation, rather than something confined to those parts of 
science which study the products of evolution. Ecosystems, for example, are as complex 
as organisms and examples of any one type of ecosystem vary greatly. Nevertheless, 
ecologists do not need to appeal to postulate a cosmic selection process in order to 
construct idealised models of ecological processes.  
 
8. Conclusions 
1. The etiological theory of function captures the sense of ‘function’ in which many neo-
Darwinians have used the term: the purpose(s) for which a character evolved by natural 
selection (selected function). 
 
                                                 
5
 Wouters makes a similar point when he identifies the target of explanation in much experimental biology 
as the viability of the organism, rather than its ability to produce a selectively optimal phenotype (Wouters 
1995, 2005a). 
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2. The sense of ‘function’ in which biologists have talked for well over a century about 
‘form and function’, and the sense in which experimental sciences such as anatomy, 
physiology, comparative morphology, developmental and molecular biology 
experimentally elucidate ‘form and function’ is causal function.  
 
3. Biological characters are primarily individuated by homology. Biologists use structural 
and (causal) functional descriptive characters, including relative position, embryonic 
origin, developmental mechanisms, gene expression, and so forth, to classify parts and 
processes by homology. The parts and processes classified in this way can, but need not, 
be assigned selective histories and selected functions in the light of their identity as 
homologues.  
 
4. The claim that all biological description makes implicit claims about the selective 
history of the characters described is not supported by the ‘argument from abnormality 
inclusive categories’. The body of established biological knowledge, which includes 
knowledge about selection histories, functions as background information in future 
investigations of any biological topic, including classification, but selection history does 
play the direct, foundational role in descriptive biology assigned to it by enthusiasts for 
selected function.  
 
5. Enthusiasts for selective function have drawn attention to an important topic for future 
research – the nature of idealisation in the biological sciences –  but their conclusion that 
idealisation is achieved by appealing to selection history is premature. 
 
 
References 
 
Abouheif, Ehab, Michael Akam, William J. Dickinson, Peter W. H. Holland, Axel 
Meyer, Nipam H. Patel, Rudolf A. Raff, V. Louise Roth, and Gregory A. Wray 
(1997), "Homology and developmental genes", Trends in Genetics 13 (11):432-
433. 
Allen, C, M Bekoff, and G.V Lauder, eds. (1997), Nature's Purposes: Analyses of 
Function and Design in Biology. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Amundson, R, and G.V Lauder (1994), "Function without purpose: the uses of causal role 
function in evolutionary biology", Biology and Philosophy 9 (4):443-470. 
Ariew, André, Robert  Cummins, and Mark Perlman, eds. (2002), Functions: New Essays 
in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology. New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Arthur, Wallace (1997), The Origin of Animal Body Plans : A study in evolutionary 
developmental biology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Brandon, R (1981), "Biological Teleology: Questions and Explanations", Studies in the 
History and Philosophy of Science 12:91-105. 
Brigandt, Ingo (2002), "Homology and the Origin of Correspondence", Biology and 
Philosophy 17:389-407. 
Submitted to Philosophy of Science  17 
——— (2003a), "Homology in comparative, molecular and evolutionary biology", 
Journal of Experimental Zoology (Molecular and Developmental Evolution) 
299B:9-17. 
——— (2003b), "Species pluralism does not imply species eliminativism", Philosophy of 
Science 70 (5):1305-1316. 
Buller, David J., ed. (1999), Function, Selection and Design. Buffalo, NY: SUNY Press. 
Camardi, Giovanni (2001), "Richard Owen, Morphology and Evolution", Journal of the 
History of Biology 34:481- 515. 
Capdevila, Javier, and Juan Carlos Ixpisúa Belmonte (2001), "Perspectives on the 
evolutionary origins of tetrapod limbs", in Gunther P Wagner (ed.), The 
Character Concept in Evolutionary Biology, San Diego: Academic Press. 
Craver, Carl F, and Lindley Darden (2005), "Special Issue: Mechanisms in Biology", 
Studies in History & Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36 
(2):233-464. 
Cummins, R (1975), "Functional analysis", Journal of Philosophy 72:741-765. 
Darwin, C (1964), On The Origin of Species: A Facsimile of the First Edition. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Davies, Paul Sheldon (2001), Norms of Nature: Naturalism and the Nature of Functions. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Griffiths, Paul E (1994), "Cladistic classification & functional explanation", Philosophy 
of Science 61 (2):206-227. 
——— (1996a), "The Historical Turn in the Study of Adaptation", British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 47 (4):511-532. 
——— (1996b), "Darwinism, Process Structuralism and Natural Kinds", Philosophy of 
Science 63 (3, Supplement):S1-S9. 
——— (1999), "Squaring the circle: Natural kinds with historical essences", in Robert A 
Wilson (ed.), Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, Cambridge, M.A: MIT 
Press, 208-228. 
——— (In Preparation), "‘Nothing in Biology Makes Sense Except in the Light of 
Evolution.’ Discuss", in. 
Hall, Brian K (1992), Evolutionary Developmental Biology. 1 ed. New York: Chapman 
and Hall. 
——— (2003), "Descent with modification: the unity underlying homology and 
homoplasy as seen through an analysis of development and evolution", Biological 
Review 78:409-433. 
———, ed. (1994), Homology: The Hierarchical Basis of Comparative Biology: 
Academic Press. 
———, ed. (1999), Homology. Edited by Gregory R Bock and Gail Cardew. Vol. 222, 
Novartis Foundation Symposia. Chichester, New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
Hillis, David M (1999), "Homology in Molecular Biology", in Brian K Hall (ed.), 
Homology: The Hierarchical Basis of Comparative Biology, San Diego, New 
York: Academic Press, 339-368. 
Hull, David L. (1987), "Genealogical actors in ecological roles", Biology & Philosophy 
2:168-184. 
Submitted to Philosophy of Science  18 
Huxley, Julian (1914), "The courtship-habits of the great crested grebe (Podiceps 
cristatus); with an addition to the theory of sexual selection", Proceedings of the 
Zoological Society of London:491-562. 
Just, Walter, Wolfgang Rau, Walther Vogel, Mikhail Akhverdian, Karl Fredga, Jennifer 
A. Marshall Graves, and Elena Lyapunova (1995), "Absence of Sry in species of 
the vole Ellobius", 11 (2):117-118. 
Laublicher, Manfred D, and Günter P Wagner (2001), "How Molecular is Molecular 
Developmental Biology? A Reply to Alex Rosenberg's Reductionism Redux: 
Computing the Embryo", Biology and Philosophy 16 (1):53-68. 
Lauder, G.V (1990), "Functional morphology: Studying functional patterns in an 
historical context", Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 21:317-340. 
Lauder, George V. (1999), "Homology, Form and Function", in Brian K Hall (ed.), 
Homology: The Hierachical Basis of Comparative Biology, San Diego, new York: 
Academic Press, 151-196. 
Lorenz, Konrad Z (1950), "The comparative method in studying innate behaviour 
patterns", Symposium of the Society of Experimental Biology 4 (Physiological 
Mechanisms in Animal Behaviour):221-268. 
——— (1966), On Aggression. Translated by Marjorie Kerr Wilson. New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and World. 
Love, Alan (2001), "Evolutionary Morphology, Innovation, and the Synthesis of 
Evolution and Development", Biology and Philosophy 18 (2):309-345. 
——— (2004), "Morphological and paleontological perspectives for a History of Evo-
Devo", in Jane Maienschein and Manfred D Laublicher (eds.), From Embryology 
to Evo-devo, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, xxx-xxx. 
Love, Alan C., and Rudolf A. Raff (2003), "Knowing your ancestors: themes in the 
history of evo-devo", Evolution & Development 5 (4):327. 
Mallatt, Jon (1996), "Ventilation and the origin of jawed vertebrates: a new mouth", 
Zoological Journal of the Linnean Society 117 (4):329-404. 
Matthen, Mohan (1998), "Biological universals and the nature of fear", Journal of 
Philosophy XVC (3):105-132. 
——— (2000), "What is a hand? What is a mind?" Revue Internationale de Philosophie 
214:653-672. 
Mayr, Ernst (1960), "The emergence of evolutionary novelties", in, Evolution After 
Darwin, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 349-380. 
Millikan, Ruth Garrett (1984), Language, Thought & Other Biological Categories. 
Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press. 
——— (1993), White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
——— (2002), "Biofunctions: Two Paradigms", in Robert Cummins, André Ariew and 
Mark Perlman (eds.), Functions: New Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology 
and Biology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 113-143. 
Müller, Gerd B, and Stuart Newman, eds. (2003), Origination of Organismal Form: 
Beyond the gene in developmental and evolutionary biology. Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press. 
Müller, Gerd B, and Günther P Wagner (1991), "Novelty in evolution: restructuring the 
concept", Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 22:229-256. 
Submitted to Philosophy of Science  19 
——— (1996), "Homology, Hox genes and developmental integration", American 
Zoologist 36:4-13. 
Neander, Karen (1983), Abnormal Psychobiology. LaTrobe University: Unpublished PhD 
Thesis. 
——— (1991a), "Functions as selected effects: the conceptual analyst's defense", 
Philosophy of Science 58:168-184. 
——— (1991b), "The teleological notion of "function"", Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 69 (4):454-468. 
——— (2002), "Types of Traits: Function, structure and homology in the classification 
of traits", in André Ariew, Robert Cummins and Mark Perlman (eds.), Functions: 
New Essays in the Philosophy of Biology and Psychology, Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Owen, Richard (1843), Lectures on the Comparative Anatomy and Physiology of the 
Vertebrate Animals, Delivered at the Royal College of Surgeons, in 1843. 
London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans. 
Pittendrigh, C. S. (1958), "Adaptation, natural selection and behavior", in Anne Roe and 
George Gaylord Simpson (eds.), Behavior and Evolution, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 390-416. 
Raff, Rudolf A. (1996), The Shape of Life: Genes, Development and the Evolution of 
Animal Form. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Raff, Rudolph A, and Alan C Love (2004), "Kowalevsky, Comparative Evolutionary 
Embryology, and the Intellectual Lineage of Evo-Devo", Journal of Experimental 
Zoology (Mol Dev Evol) 302B:19-34. 
Roth, Louise V (1999), "Within and Between Organisms: Replicators, lineages and 
homologues", in Brian K Hall (ed.), Homology: The hierarchical basis of 
comparative biology, San Diego, New York: Academic Press, 301-337. 
Sattler, Rolf (1990), "Towards a more dynamic plant morphology", Acta Biotheoretica 
38:303-315. 
Schlosser, Gerhard, and Günter P. Wagner, eds. (2004), Modularity in Development and 
Evolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,. 
Tinbergen, N (1951), The Study of Instinct. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wagner, Günter P (1989), "The biological homology concept", Annual Review of 
Ecology & Systematics 20:51-69. 
——— (1994), "Homology and the Mechanisms of Development", in B.K Hall (ed.), 
Homology: The Hierarchical Basis of Comparative Biology, New York: 
Academic Press, 273-299. 
——— (2001), "Characters, units and natural kinds: An introduction", in Gunther P 
Wagner (ed.), The Character Concept in Evolutionary Biology, San Diego: 
Academic Press. 
———, ed. (2001), The Character Concept in Evolutionary Biology. San Diego: 
Academic Press. 
Weber, Marcel (2004), Philosophy of Experimental Biology. Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Wimsatt, William C. (1972), "Teleology and the Logical Structure of Function 
Statements", Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 3 (1972):1-80. 
Submitted to Philosophy of Science  20 
Winther, Rasmus G (2001), "Varieties of Modules: Kinds, Levels, Origins, and 
Behaviors", Journal of Experimental Zoology (Mol Dev Evol) 291:116-129. 
——— (In Press), "Parts and Theories in Compositional Biology", Biology and 
Philosophy. 
Wouters, Arno (1995), "Viability Explanation", Biology and Philosophy 10 (4):435-457. 
——— (2005), "The Functions Debate in Philosophy", Acta Biotheoretica 53:123-151. 
——— (2005a), "The functional perspective in evolutionary biology", in T.A.C Reydon 
and L Hemerik (eds.), Current Themes in Theoretical Biology: Springer, 33-69. 
 
Submitted to Philosophy of Science  21 
 
 
Submitted to Philosophy of Science  22 
 
 
Figure Caption  
 
 
Figure 1. Homologies of the mammalian incus. 
